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endangered species and their habitat. The biological opinion the EPA
relied on was fatally deficient in ignoring indirect effects of the loss of
section 7 consultation.
The court then looked for other independent bases on which the
EPA could have rationally relied for its transfer decision. The court
held the EPA did not give a sufficiently detailed discussion of effects on
all listed species, resulting in a failure to consider an important aspect
of the transfer decision. The court held the protections the EPA
claimed could substitute for section 7 protections were insufficient.
These protections included a Memorandum of Agreement between
the EPA and an Arizona agency, EPA oversight, the ESA's anti-take
provisions, and Arizona state law. The EPA's own Biological Evaluation
report did not give sufficient devotion to endangered species protection. The EPA's reliance on assurances from one Arizona state agency
was not comprehensive enough to be sufficient.
The court concluded the EPA erred in relying on the biological
opinion when it made its transfer decision. Further, the EPA did not
provide sufficient independent bases to support its transfer decision.
Thus, the EPA entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, making its transfer decision arbitrary and capricious.
The court concluded by vacating the EPA's decision to approve Arizona's pollution permitting application, transferring Defenders' suit
challenging the validity of the biological opinion back to the district
court, and granting and remanding to the EPA the petition for review
for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Julie M. Schmidt
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 418 F.3d 971 (9th
Cir. 2005) (granting preliminary injunction to environmental and conservation organizations based on violation of the Endangered Species
Act; ordering the federal agency in charge of the Columbia River
Power System to provide summer water spill rather than pass water
through turbines in order to avoid harm to threatened species; holding that the district court did not apply an incorrect legal standard by
failing to weigh economic harm to the public in reaching its conclusion).
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") operates the dams and
power plants comprising the Federal Columbia River Power System
("FCRPS"), which consists of fourteen sets of dams. The United States
District Court for the District of Oregon granted the National Wildlife
Foundation ("NWF") a preliminary injunction order, requiring NMFS
to pass a specified amount of water through the spill gates of dams
rather than through turbines for power generation, in order to avoid
irreparable harm to threatened species.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

The Columbia River is the fourth largest river on the North American continent. It drains approximately 259,000 square miles, including
territory in seven states and one Canadian province. It flows for more
than 1,200 miles from the base of the Canadian Rockies to the Pacific
Ocean. Every year, hundreds of thousands of salmon and steelhead
travel up and down the river and its tributaries. There are now thirteen species of salmon and steelhead protected by the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"), each of which migrate to different parts of the
Columbia Basin. The management of the Columbia River System has
been heavily influenced by the ESA, which imposes a consultation duty
upon federal agencies in an effort to conserve ESA listed species.
From the consultation process, the federal agency produces a biological opinion, which assesses the effects of a proposed agency action on
the survival of species based on potential harm to the habitat.
In granting the preliminary injunction order, the district court
held that NMFS violated the ESA in the issuance of its 2004 biological
opinion ("2004 BiOp"). The 2004 BiOp failed to aggregate the impacts from the proposed action, the environmental baseline, and the
cumulative impacts as the basis for its jeopardy analysis. Concluding
that it could not distinguish between the effects of discretionary and
nondiscretionary FCRPS operations, the NMFS created a hypothetical
"reference operation" in the 2004 BiOp, to which it compared the discretionary proposed action. Instead of evaluating whether the aggregate of the proposed agency action, the environmental baseline, cumulative effects, and current status of the species would jeopardize the
salmon and steelhead, NMFS evaluated whether the proposed agency
action, consisting of only the proposed discretionary operation of the
FCRPS, would have no net effect on a species when compared to the
environmental baseline.
The district court also found that the 2004 BiOp was not entitled to
deference because it represented a complete reversal from the prior
2000 opinion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction, finding the district court's conclusions were grounded in the
ESA. The court rejected the NMFS argument that the district court
erred as a matter of law by failing to weigh economic harm to the public in its preliminary injunction analysis. The court reasoned that such
analysis does not apply to ESA cases because Congress has struck the
balance in favor of affording endangered species the highest priority.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, but remanded the question of whether the injunction should be more narrowly tailored or modified to the district court.
The court expressed no opinion on the ultimate merits of the summary judgment decision before the district court.
Keely Downs

